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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes a marked change in the evolution of the U.S. wage structure over the past fifteen
years: divergent trends in upper-tail (90/50) and lower-tail (50/10) wage inequality.  We document
that wage inequality in the top half of distribution has displayed an unchecked and rather smooth
secular rise for the last 25 years (since 1980). Wage inequality in the bottom half of the distribution
also grew rapidly from 1979 to 1987, but it has ceased growing (and for some measures actually
narrowed) since the late 1980s.  Furthermore we find that occupational employment growth shifted
from monotonically increasing in wages (education) in the 1980s to a pattern of more rapid growth
in jobs at the top and bottom relative to the middles of the wage (education) distribution in the
1990s.    We  characterize  these  patterns  as  the  “polarization”  of  the  U.S.  labor  market,  with
employment polarizing into high-wage and low-wage jobs at the expense of middle-wage work.  We
show how a model of computerization in which computers most strongly complement the non-
routine (abstract) cognitive tasks of high-wage jobs, directly substitute for the routine tasks found
in many traditional middle-wage jobs, and may have little direct impact on non-routine manual tasks





















Much research (surveyed in Lawrence F. Katz and David H. Autor [1999] and Daron 
Acemoglu [2002]) documents a substantial widening of the U.S. wage structure since the late 
1970s, largely driven by increases in educational wage differentials and residual (within-group) 
wage inequality. The growth in overall wage inequality was most rapid during the 1980s, and 
involved a spreading out of the entire wage distribution. Rapid secular growth in the demand for 
skills, partly driven by skill-biased technical change (SBTC), combined with a sharp slowdown 
in the growth of the relative supply of college workers (starting in the early 1980s) help to 
explain these wage changes. The erosion of labor market institutions protecting low- and middle-
wage workers—the minimum wage and unions—further contributed to rising wage inequality, 
especially during the 1980s.  
Recent work challenges these conclusions emphasizing a slowdown in the growth of U.S. 
wage inequality over the last fifteen years (David Card and John DiNardo 2002; Thomas 
Lemieux 2006). This “revisionist” literature views the surge in wage inequality of the 1980s as 
an “episodic” event driven by institutional forces and argues that the more “modest” inequality 
growth in the 1990s is inconsistent with a key role for SBTC and other market forces. 
 In this paper, we reconsider this revisionist view, focusing on a marked change in the 
evolution of the U.S. wage structure over the past 15 years: divergent trends in upper- and lower-
tail wage inequality. In Section I, we document that wage inequality in the top half of the 
distribution has exhibited an unchecked secular rise for the last 25 years (since 1980), but it has 
ceased growing since the late 1980s (and for some measures narrowed) in the bottom half of the 
distribution. In Section II, we show that the pattern of employment growth differed sharply in the 
1990s versus the 1980s with more rapid growth of employment in jobs (occupations) at the 
bottom and top relative to the middle of the wage (and skill) distribution. Borrowing the   2  
 
 
terminology of Maarten Goos and Alan Manning (2003) from work on Britain, we characterize 
this pattern as the “polarization” of the U.S. labor market, with employment polarizing into high-
wage and low-wage jobs at the expense of traditional middle-skill jobs. We document that 
quantity and price changes covary positively throughout the distribution of earnings—both in the 
1980s, when the wage structure was spreading monotonically, and in the 1990s, when the wage 
structure was polarizing. These patterns suggest a central role for labor demand shifts in 
explaining wage structure changes of the last twenty-five years. We show in Section III how a 
simple model of computerization (based on Autor, Frank Levy, and Richard Murnane [2003]) in 
which computers complement non-routine (abstract) cognitive tasks, substitute for routine tasks, 
and may have little impact on non-routine manual tasks, can help explain the observed 
polarization of the U.S. labor market. Section IV concludes. 
 
I. Divergent Upper- and Lower-Tail Wage Inequality 
Figure 1 displays the evolution of the 90-50 and 50-10 log hourly wage differentials for all 
workers (males and females combined) from 1973 to 2004 using (hours-weighted) wage data 
from the Current Population Survey (CPS) May samples (for 1973-78) and Merged Outgoing 
Rotation Group (MORG) samples (for 1979 to 2004).
1 The plot shows similar substantial 
increases in upper-half (90-50) and lower-half (50-10) wage inequality from 1979 to 1987, 
expanding the 90-10 log wage differential by 21 log points. But the trends in top-half and 
bottom-half inequality diverge after 1987 with upper-half wage inequality continuing to rise 
steadily over the last 15 years while the growth in lower-half inequality ceased in the late 1980s 
                                                 
1 All of our sample selection and data processing steps for CPS wage data are the same as those described 
in the Data Appendix of Autor, Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney (2005a) extended to cover wage data for 
2004. 
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(with an actual contraction in the 50-10 log wage differential of 4 log points from 1987 to 
2004).
2 The net effect has been a slower growth of only 4 log points in the 90-10 log wage 
differential since 1987. These trends are robust across numerous samples and data sources. 
Monotonic rising wage inequality in the 1980s and diverging upper- and lower-tail wage 
inequality since the late 1980s are observed for males and females separately, for hourly wages 
(based on annual earnings divided by hours worked in the previous calendar year) from the CPS 
March Samples, and for the weekly wages of full-time workers in both the March and MORG 
CPS samples (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2005a).
3  
Figure 2 illustrates more precisely where in the wage structure the divergence of upper- and 
lower-tail wage inequality trends has occurred. Figure 2 plots cumulative log hourly real 
earnings growth (indexed using the Personal Consumption Expenditures implicit price deflator) 
by wage percentile for 1973 to 1988 and for 1988 to 2004. The figure shows an almost linear 
spreading out of the entire wage distribution (from the 3
rd to 97
th percentile) in the first half of 
the sample (driven by changes in the 1980s). In contrast, wage growth has polarized since 1988, 
with faster wage growth in the bottom quartile than in middle two quartiles and with the most 
rapid rise and a continued spreading out of the wage distribution in the top quartile.   
The divergence of upper- and lower-tail wage inequality since the late 1980s also holds for 
residual wage inequality and is robust to (and even reinforced by) adjustments for labor force 
composition (demographic) changes (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2005b).
4 Similar patterns are 
                                                 
2 This divergence in trends in the 90-50 and 50-10 log hourly wage differentials using CPS data has also 
been emphasized by Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, and Sylvia Allegretto (2005). 
3 The magnitude of wage inequality growth is larger for both males and females when analyzed separately 
than for the overall sample (given the narrowing of the gender gap), and wage inequality grew by more 
over the last fifteen years using March rather than the MORG CPS samples.  
4 Between-group wage inequality similarly shows a faster growth in the top-half than the bottom-half of 
the distribution since the 1980s.  For example, Lemieux (2005) documents the growing “convexifiation”   4  
 
 
found for total employee compensation in the micro data from Employment Cost Index (Brooks 
Pierce 2001) and for annual wage and salary earnings based on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
micro data (Ian Dew-Becker and Robert J. Gordon 2005).  Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez 
(2003) further document the persistent divergence of annual earnings in the very upper-end of 
distribution (the top 1%) relative to other workers since the 1970s using IRS tax-return data. 
Some researchers speculate that the growing skewness of the upper part of the wage 
distribution reflects changes in social norms (Piketty and Saez 2003), and others (Card and 
DiNardo 2002; Lemieux 2006) argue that the slowdown of 90-10 wage inequality growth in the 
1990s speaks in favor of institutional factors (especially the minimum wage) and against SBTC 
and other market mechanisms for changes in the wage structure. But the time pattern of changes 
in the minimum wage does not do much to explain the evolution of wage inequality even in the 
bottom half of the distribution outside the 1979 to 1987 period (Autor, Katz and Kearney 2005a). 
The ‘social norms’ explanation—while potentially promising—needs further refinement to be 
directly testable. 
We examine how a more nuanced view of technological change than the usual SBTC model 
(based on a single-index view of skill) may contribute to an explanation for observed wage 
inequality trends. Building on Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), our conceptual framework 
observes that the first-order impact of computerization is to displace (substitute for) a set of 
‘middle skilled’ routine cognitive and manual tasks, such as bookkeeping, clerical work and 
repetitive production tasks.
5 If these routine tasks are more complementary to high-skilled, 
abstract tasks (problem-solving, management and coordination) than to ‘non-routine manual’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
of U.S. returns to schooling over recent decades with the returns to post-secondary schooling (especially 
post-college training) rising sharply and returns to lower levels of education remaining largely unchanged. 
5 Levy and Murnane (2004) provide a rich elaboration and extension of these ideas.  In earlier work, 
Chinhui Juhn (1994) discusses evidence and explanations for a decline in demand for ‘middle-skill’ 
workers.   5  
 
 
tasks (such as those performed by truck drivers, waiters and security guards), the 
computerization of routine work can lead to a polarization of the structure of employment and 
earnings. The model predicts that a period of wage structure polarization should be accompanied 
by employment polarization, a pattern that is strongly supported by our analysis below. 
 
II. Job Polarization Trends  
We examine trends in the “quality,” skill content, and task content of U.S. jobs since 1980. 
We follow Goos and Manning’s (2003) analysis of the U.K. in exploring how U.S. employment 
growth by occupation has been related to skill (or job quality) proxied by initial wages or 
educational levels.  
We first sort occupations into percentiles by their median hourly wage in 1980 (actually 
based on 1979 earnings) using data from the 1980 Census Integrated Public Use Microsample 
(IPUMS). Figure 3 plots employment growth, measured as a share of total hours worked in the 
economy, from 1980-1990 and 1990-2000, against 1980 occupational wage percentile using 
employment data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 IPUMS.
6 For the 1980s, the figure shows 
declining employment at the bottom end of the occupational distribution and rather monotonic 
increases in employment shares as one moves up the wage structure (with a little dip from the 
55
th to 80
th percentile). In sharp contrast, employment growth in the 1990s appears to have 
polarized. We observe rapid employment growth in low-wage and high-wage jobs in the 1990s 
and slow growth in the middle of the wage distribution.  
                                                 
6 We employ a consistent set of occupation codes for Census years 1980, 1990 and 2000 developed by 
Peter B. Meyer and Anastasiya M. Osborne (2005). We use a locally weighted smoothing regression 
(bandwidth 0.8 with 100 observations) to fit the relationship between decadal growth in occupational 
employment share and occupations’ initial skill percentile in the 1980 skill distribution, measured by 
median occupational wages or average years of schooling. Figures 3 and 4 plot the fitted values from 
these regressions. 
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This pattern of job growth (and possible labor demand shifts) corresponds well with the 
observed pattern of wage structure changes shown in Figure 2. In a comparison of the 1980s to 
the 1990s, we find that employment growth is more rapid in the 1990s below the 25
th and above 
the 65
th percentiles of the occupational wage distribution and declined in the middle (from the 
25
th to the 65
th percentiles).  
We test the robustness of these patterns by utilizing an alternative skill definition: the mean 
years of schooling in an occupation in 1980. Figure 4 displays the analogous plot of U.S. 
occupational employment growth in the 1980s and 1990s by 1980 occupational education 
percentiles. Using this skill measure, we find near-monotonic (almost linear) increases in 
employment growth moving up the education distribution in the 1980s.  We also find that 
employment growth has polarized in the 1990s, with more rapid employment growth in the 
bottom end of the education distribution than in the middle. The most rapid (and diverging) 
employment gains are concentrated in the top part of the education distribution. 
Acemoglu (1999) also finds U.S. job polarization from the mid-1980s to early 1990s using 
more aggregated industry-occupation cells, and Goos and Manning (2003) document job growth 
polarization by detailed occupations from 1979 to 1999 for Britain—another country with a large 
increase in wage inequality. Furthermore, Spitz-Oener (2006) reports job polarization in West 
Germany, a labor market where wage inequality has been rather quiescent until recently.   These 
similar patterns of recent employment growth polarization for several rich countries are 
suggestive of similar market demand shifts favoring jobs at the top and bottom relative to the 
middle of the skill (wage) distribution.  But the much larger growth in wage inequality in the 
United States and Britain than in Germany in recent decades also suggests that differences in   7  
 
 
labor market and educational institutions may greatly affect how such demand shifts translate 
into wage structure changes.  
A third methodology for measuring U.S. employment structure trends is to directly examine 
changes in job task content. Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) take this approach using data on 
detailed tasks from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles aggregated to 3-digit Census 
occupations. Though not depicted, we have extended their data analysis of employment growth 
in industry-gender-education cells using CPS data through 2002. We find that employment 
growth was most rapid in the 1990s for cells intensive in non-routine cognitive tasks (those most 
complementary with computerization), was declining and decelerating in the 1990s for cells 
most intensive in routine cognitive and manual tasks (those most substitutable for computers), 
and ceased declining in the 1990s for (typically low-wage) jobs intensive in non-routine manual 
tasks. 
These patterns of employment growth by wages, education, and task intensity suggest that 
labor demand shifts have favored low- and high-wage workers relative to middle-wage workers 
over the last fifteen years. This pattern stands in contrast to the shifts in labor demand evident 
during the decade of the 1980s, which appear to have been monotonically rising in skill. We now 
offer a conceptual framework for interpreting these trends.  
 
III. A Model and Interpretation 
Our framework, building on Autor, Levy, Murnane (2003), considers how a decline in the 
real price of computing power may lead to a polarization of work, as measured by traditional 
skill measures. The model builds on four observations that we believe are well-supported by the 
case-study and representative evidence (see Levy and Murnane [2004]).  First, computer   8  
 
 
capital—denoted by K  in our model and measured in efficiency units—is a close substitute for 
human labor in routine cognitive and manual tasks, such as bookkeeping, clerical work and 
repetitive production tasks. Second, routine task input—embodied in either computer capital or 
human labor—is a complement to workers engaged in abstract reasoning tasks such as problem 
solving, coordination, and other high-level management activities. Third, there exists a panoply 
of non-routine manual tasks for which computers currently neither directly substitute nor 
strongly complement, such as the job tasks performed by truck drivers, security guards, waiters 
and janitors. For brevity, we refer to these three categories of tasks as Abstract ( A), Routine () R  
and Manual ( M ), and we consider them to roughly correspond to high, intermediate and low 
skilled occupations as measured by earnings or education.  
We observe that workers’ ability to engage in specific tasks is partially contingent on their 
education. For simplicity, we assume that there are two types of workers: College workers, who 
can perform Abstract tasks, and High School workers who can freely substitute between Routine 
and Manual tasks.  
The exogenous driving force in our model is the well-documented precipitous decline in the 
price of computing power of recent decades. Computerization—by which we mean the falling 
price of computer power—lowers the price of Routine task input and increases demand for 
Routine tasks. We sketch the formal model here and refer the reader to the Theory Appendix for 
full details. 
Output in this economy, priced at unity, is produced using the aggregate Cobb-Douglas 
production function YA R M
αβ γ = with  ( ) ,, 0 , 1 αβγ∈ ,  1 α βγ + +=, and where  , AR and  M  
denote the three tasks above. Abstract and manual tasks are performed by workers who supply 
labor inputs,  A L  and  M L . Routine tasks can be performed either by workers who supply  R L or by   9  
 
 
computer capital, K , measured in efficiency units, which is a perfect substitute for  R L . 
Computer capital is supplied perfectly elastically to Routine tasks at price ρ , which is falling 
over time at an exogenous rate. 
There are a large number of workers with educational supplies assumed exogenous. A 
fraction  ( ) 0,1 θ ∈  are High School workers and the remaining 1 θ −  are College workers. Each 
College workers is endowed with one efficiency unit of Abstract skill, which she supplies 
inelastically to Abstract tasks. Each High School worker i is endowed with one efficiency unit 
of skill in Manual tasks and  i η  efficiency units of skill in Routine tasks, where η  is continuously 
distributed on the unit interval with positive probability mass at all points  [] 0,1 η∈ . High school 
workers do not possess Abstract skills.
7 
The supply of High School labor to Routine and Manual tasks is determined by self-
selection. Let  m w  and  r w  each the wages paid to Manual and Routine tasks. Each High School 
worker i chooses to supply either one efficiency unit of labor to Manual tasks if  / im r ww η <  or 
supplies  i η  efficiency units of labor to Routine tasks otherwise. Thus labor supply to Manual 
(Routine) tasks is weakly upward (downward) sloping in  / mr ww .  
Equilibrium in the model occurs when: (1) the economy operates on the demand curve of the 
aggregate production function; (2) each factor is paid its marginal product ( / A wY A =∂ ∂ , 
/ R wY R =∂ ∂  and  / M wY M =∂ ∂ ); and (3) the labor market clears so that no worker wishes to 
reallocate labor input among tasks.  
                                                 
7 A more complete version of this model would allow for endogenous longer-run educational supply 
responses to college versus high school earnings opportunities, endow college workers with routine as 
well as abstract skills, endow high school workers with some abstract skills, and allow for heterogeneity 
in abstract skills among college workers.  Heterogeneity in abstract skills among college workers will 
tend to reinforce the spreading out of the top end of the wage distribution in response to declining real 
computer prices.  Endogenous education responses could eventually work to offset some of the impacts of 
computer price declines on wage inequality.   10  
 
 
Because computer capital is a perfect substitute for routine labor input, it is immediate that 
r w ρ = . Hence, a decline in ρ  reduces  r w  one for one. We are interested in the effect of a 
decline in ρ  on: (1) the equilibrium quantity of Routine task input; (2) the allocation of labor 
between Routine and Manual tasks; (3) the wage paid to each task; and (4) the observed wage in 
each job type—which, in the case of Routine tasks, may differ from the wage paid per efficiency 
unit of Routine task input. 
Since own-factor demand curves are downward sloping, a decline in ρ  raises demand for 
Routine tasks. This demand can be supplied by either additional computer capital or additional 
Routine labor input. Due to worker self-selection, the additional demand will be supplied by 
computer capital. The reason, as we demonstrate formally in the Theory Appendix, is that 
Manual and Routine tasks are q-complements—a rise in Routine input (spurred by the fall in ρ ) 
raises the marginal productivity of Manual task input.  
Note, however, that when ρ  (and thereby  r w ) falls, a subset of workers—those with 
relatively low η —self-select from Routine to Manual tasks. This additional labor supply works 
against the beneficial effects of computerization on the Manual wage. In fact, it is possible for 
both  m w  and  r w  to fall when  ρ  declines. Nevertheless, the wage of Manual relative to Routine 
tasks ( / mr ww ) unambiguously rises.  
We distinguish, however, between the wage of Routine tasks measured in efficiency units 
and the observed wages of workers in routine tasks, which are affected by composition. As 
workers self-select out of Routine tasks, the remaining Routine workers have above average 
Routine skills, meaning that the observed Routine wage can either rise or fall (both overall and 
relative to  m w ) as ρ  declines.    11  
 
 
As with Manual workers, workers in Abstract tasks benefit from a rise in Routine task input 
due to q-complementarity. In the case of Abstract tasks, however, there is no countervailing 
labor supply response to buffer the positive impact of computerization on the Abstract wage. 
Consequently, computerization unambiguously raises  a w , both absolutely and relative to  r w  and 
m w .  A more realistic production function would reinforce this pattern by allowing for greater 
complementarity between Routine and Abstract tasks than between Routine and Manual tasks. 
In what sense does this stylized framework represent a polarization of work? The key 
observation of the model is that computers do not appear to directly substitute for the lowest 
skilled workers; rather they appear to displace a set of ‘middle skilled’ routine tasks. Displacing 
this ‘middle’ generates polarization through three mechanisms. First, it directly lowers the wage 
of middle-skill tasks. Second, it raises the wage of high-skilled (Abstract) tasks through q-
complementarity. Finally, it has ambiguous effects on the wages of low-skilled (Manual) tasks 
due to offsetting impacts of q-complementarity and additional labor supply emanating from 
workers displaced from Routine tasks. Thus, computerization always raises ‘upper-tail’ 
inequality in our model—that is the, wage gap between Abstract and Routine tasks. But it can 
either expand or compress ‘lower-tail’ inequality—that is, the wage gap between Routine and 
Manual tasks—depending on whether the q-complementarity or labor supply effect dominates.  
It is potentially useful to think of the model as moving successively between two equilibria 
as the price of computer capital declines. In the initial equilibrium, computerization displaces 
workers from Routine and into Manual tasks, thus depressing wages in both the ‘middle’ and 
(potentially) the ‘bottom’ of the distribution even as the Abstract wage increases. When ρ  falls 
sufficiently far, however, the model exhibits a second equilibrium in which Routine tasks are 
performed exclusively by K . In this equilibrium, only the q-complementarity effect is operative;   12  
 
 
further declines in ρ  raise wages in both Manual and Abstract tasks. Thus, the model is 
heuristically consistent with an initially ‘monotone’ wage impact of computerization followed by 
a polarization of the earnings distribution as job tasks performed by workers ‘hollow out’ to 
encompass only Abstract and Manual tasks.
8 A similar (complementary) impact of international 
outsourcing could arise from the declining international communication and coordination costs 
associated with improvements in information technology (see Levy and Murnane [2004] and Pol 
Antras, Luis Garicano, and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg [2006]).  
  
IV. Conclusions 
In our view, the key new wage structure ‘facts’ documented by recent analyses are the 
smooth, secular rise in upper-tail inequality over the last twenty five years coupled with an 
expansion and then compression of lower-tail inequality. These facts are not easily explained by 
standard institutional stories. For example, the minimum wage explanation for trends in lower-
tail inequality only fits the data well to 1987 (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2005a) and cannot 
explain why employment in low-wage occupations fell precipitously as the minimum wage 
dropped (nor why upper-tail inequality has risen steadily). The changing ‘social norms’ 
explanation for the remarkable skewing of the upper-reaches of the income distribution since the 
early 1970s, while intriguing, needs to be formulated in more precise manner with clear testable 
predictions. 
                                                 
8 The computerization of relatively low-wage, routine jobs (such as those in lower-wage manufacturing 
industries and some clerical work) might be easier to initially envision and implement than for other 
work. And it may be that only with further improvements in software and computer-based technologies 
does the re-organization of more middle-wage, middle-skill tasks (high-paid precision production work 
and middle management work) become possible.   This process could reinforce a pattern of the 
substitution for workers by computers moving up the wage (skill) structure over time. 
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Our analysis offers surprisingly unambiguous evidence that demand shifts are likely to be a 
key component of any cogent explanation for the changing US wage structure. In particular, we 
find that quantity and price changes covary positively throughout the entire distribution of 
earnings—and this is true in the 1980s, when the wage structure was spreading monotonically, 
and in the 1990s, when the wage structure was polarizing. We believe that a conceptual 
framework focused on the changing distribution of job task demands, spurred directly by 
advancing information technology and indirectly by its impact on international outsourcing, goes 
some distance towards understanding the recent polarization of the U.S. wage structure. The 
similarity across several countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany) in 
employment growth polarization combined with some differences in wage structure changes 
suggests the need to seriously consider the roles of market forces, institutional factors, and their 
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 Figure 1. Male and Female Log Hourly 90/50 and 50/10 Earnings Ratios. 
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oFigure 2. Changes in Male and Female Log Real Hourly Earnings by Percentile 













































eFigure 3. Smoothed Changes in Occupational Employment Shares 1980 - 
2000, with occupations ranked by their 1980 Median Wage. Source: Census 
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eFigure 4. Smoothed Changes in Occupational Employment Shares 1980 - 
2000, with occupations ranked by their 1980 Average Years of Schooling. 
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1. Workplace tasks may be usually subdivided into three broad groups:
(a) Abstract problem-solving and managerial tasks. These tasks are not well structured and
require non-routine cognitive skills.
(b) Routine tasks. These may either be cognitive or physical tasks that they follow closely
prescribed sets of rules and procedures and are executed in a well-controlled environment.
(c) Manual tasks. These tasks (which ALM call non-routine manual) do not require abstract
problem solving or managerial skills but are nevertheless di¢ cult to automate because they
require some ￿ exibility in a less than fully predictable environment. Examples include:
truck drivers, security guards, unskilled medical personnel, janitors and house-cleaners,
high speed check-keyers, construction workers, many in-person servers.
2. Routine tasks are complementary to Abstract tasks and perhaps also to Manual tasks (though
probably less so).
3. Routine tasks are readily substituted with computer capital. The continually falling price of
computer capital drives this substitution.
4. The falling price of computer capital generates an incentive for workers engaged in Routine tasks
to switch to other tasks.
5. It is more di¢ cult for workers displaced from Routine tasks to shift ￿ up￿to Abstract tasks than
it is for them to shift ￿ down￿to Manual tasks.
2 Model
2.1 Production
Aggregate output in this economy (priced at unity) is given by the Cobb-Douglas production function
Y = A￿R￿M￿;
where A;R and M are Abstract, Routine and Manual tasks, with exponents ￿;￿;￿ 2 (0;1) respec-
tively, and ￿ + ￿ + ￿ = 1. Abstract and manual tasks can only be performed by workers who supply
labor inputs, LA and LM: Routine tasks can be performed either by workers who supply LR or by
computer capital, K, measured in e¢ ciency units, which is a perfect substitute for LR:
22.2 Factor supplies
Computer capital is supplied perfectly elastically to Routine tasks at price ￿ per e¢ ciency unit. The
secularly declining price of computer capital is the exogenous driving force in this model.
There is a large number of income-maximizing workers in this economy, each endowed with a
vector of three skills, Si = (ai;ri;mi), where lower-case letters denote an individual￿ s skill endowment
for the three production tasks.
Workers are of two types. A fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) are High School (H) workers and the remaining 1￿￿
are College (C) workers. For simplicity, all college workers are assumed identical. Each is endowed
with one e¢ ciency unit of Abstract skill: SC (a;r;m) = (1;0;0).1 The labor supply of each college
worker is LC = (1;0;0).
All high school workers are equally skilled in Manual tasks but di⁄er in their ability in Routine
tasks. We write the skill endowment of high school worker i as SH
i (a;r;mi) = (0;￿i;1), where ￿ is a
continuous variable distributed on the unit interval with positive probability mass at all points ￿ 2
(0;1). The labor supply of High School worker i is LH
i (a;r;m) = (0;￿i￿i;(1 ￿ ￿i)) where ￿i 2 [0;1].
Each High School worker chooses ￿i to maximize earnings.
2.3 Equilibrium concept
Equilibrium in this model occurs when:
1. Productive e¢ ciency is achieved￿ that is, the economy operates on the demand curve of the
aggregate production function for each factor.
2. All factors are paid their marginal products.
3. The labor market clears; no worker wishes to reallocate labor input among tasks.
2.4 Productive e¢ ciency













1It would be a very minor matter to instead assume that LC (a;r;m) = (1;1;1) with wa > wr;wm for all relevant
cases. This would ensure that college-workers always supply Abstract labor￿ and of course this tendency would only be
reinforced by a falling price of computer capital.
32.5 Self-selection of workers to tasks
The supply of College labor to Abstract tasks is inelastic.
The supply of High School labor to Routine and Manual tasks is determined by self-selection. Each
High School worker i chooses to supply one e¢ ciency unit of labor to Manual tasks if ￿i < wm=wr,
and supplies ￿i e¢ ciency units of labor to Routine tasks otherwise. We can write the labor supply
functions to Manual and Routine tasks as LM (wm=wr) = ￿
P
i 1[￿i < wm=wr] and LR (wm=wr) =
￿
P
i ￿i ￿1[￿i ￿ wm=wr], where 1[￿] is the indicator function. Observe that L0
M (￿) ￿ 0 and L0
R (￿) ￿ 0.
2.6 Equilibrium and comparative statics
Since computer capital is a perfect substitute for routine labor input, it is immediate that wr = ￿ and
hence a decline in ￿ reduces wr one for one.2
We are interested in the e⁄ect of a decline in ￿ on:
1. The equilibrium quantity of Routine task input
2. The allocation of labor between Routine and Manual tasks
3. The wage paid to each task
4. The observed wage in each job type (which in may di⁄er from the wage per e¢ ciency unit in
Routine tasks)
A decline in ￿ raises demand for Routine tasks, since own-factor demand curves are downward
sloping (R0 (￿) < 0). This demand can be supplied by either additional computer capital or Routine
labor input. Due to worker self-selection, the additional demand will be supplied by computer capital.
To see this, let ￿￿ equal the Manual skill level of the marginal worker, such that ￿￿ = wm=wr.
































A decline in ￿ raises the relative Manual/Routine wage.
2Technically, ￿ only binds wr from above. In an earlier period, when computer capital was far more expensive, it￿ s
plausible that wr < ￿: For the period under study, we assume that this constraint binds.
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A decline in the price of computer capital lowers the wage of Routine labor input, raises the wage
of Abstract labor input through two channels of q-complementarity￿ increased use of Routine task
input and increased labor supply to Manual task input￿ and has ambiguous implications for the wage
of Manual task input (due to the countervailing e⁄ects of q-complementarity between Routine and
Manual tasks and increased labor supply to Manual tasks).
Though, as established above, a decline in ￿ yields a larger proportionate fall in the wage of
Routine than Manual tasks (￿@ (wm=wr)=@￿ > 0), the observed log wage di⁄erential between workers
in Routine and Manual jobs may rise despite the fall in wr=wm. The reason is that a decline in wr
leads to marginal workers with lower values of ￿ to exit Routine jobs, inducing a positive compositional
shift in the pool of workers in Routine occupations (￿@E [￿j￿ > ￿￿]=@￿ > 0).
Summarizing:
1. A decline in the price of computer capital causes an increase in demand for Routine task input.
2. This increase is entirely supplied by computer capital as the price decline causes a corresponding
reduction in labor supply to Routine tasks and an increase in labor supply to Manual tasks.
3. The reduction in the price of computer capital has the following implications for wages levels





























where ￿ hats￿over wage variables denote observed values that do not adjust for changes in occu-
pational skill composition (e.g., @E [￿j￿ > ￿￿]=@￿).3
3For Manual and Abstract tasks, compositional shifts are nil by assumption.
5Remark 1: The model does not pin down the ranking of wages in Abstract, Routine and Manual
tasks; these levels depend on labor supplies and ￿. For workers who switch from Routine to Manual
tasks as ￿ falls, the manual wage must be higher than the Routine wage (wm > ￿iwr). But for
inframarginal Routine workers, it must be the case that the Routine wage is higher than the Manual
wage. This observation has an important empirical implication: if there are any workers remaining in
the Routine job, their observed wage (i.e., not accounting for composition) must be higher than the
wage in the Manual job since there is no skill heterogeneity in Manual tasks. Hence, even in cases
where wr < wm, it will be true that ^ wr > ^ wm provided that LR (wm=wr) > 0.
Remark 2: In an equilibrium in which H workers supply both Routine tasks and Manual tasks,
K is a direct substitute for some H workers and a complement to others. In this setting, a decline
in ￿ causes a ￿ widening￿of wage inequality by lowering wm relative to wa (moreover, wm may fall in
absolute terms). In an equilibrium with ￿ su¢ ciently low such that no workers remain in Routine
tasks (wm=wr > 1), further declines in ￿ unambiguously bene￿t both High School and College workers
and hence do not augment inequality. (Given the Cobb-Douglas form, both groups bene￿t equally, so
this has no e⁄ect on wa=wm.)
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